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Abstract
The object of this paper is to show what cross-country comparisons of medium run
economic performance reveal about recent economic history. In particular, looking over the
period 1960–2002, we show how cross-country data support the notion of a technological
revolution that started in the late seventies, with an adjustment process that lasted at
least until the mid–nineties for the fastest adjusting countries. The data also reveals that
country–level rates of population growth was a key factor driving the speed of adjustment to
the new technological paradigm, thereby indicating that much of the differences in economic
performances over the period can be explained by demographic differences across countries as
opposed to institutional structure. We argue that the observed pattern of structural change
appears most consistent with a process of widespread adoption of a new means of production
that rendered the labor market more competitive at the cost of a permanent negative level
effect on productivity.
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Introduction
One statement with which virtually all economic observers can agree is that the modern economy
is in a state of continual flux. From one decade to another, the technologies in use are contin-
uously evolving and the patterns of trade are switching. However, there is a widespread belief
that some historical periods involve more drastic change than others, that is, there are periods
where the intrinsic functioning of the economy appears to change while in other periods change
appears more incremental and occurs within the bounds of the same general paradigm. Many
observers argue that what we have witnessed recently can be categorized as a drastic structural
change, whether it be called the arrival of post–industrial society, the globalized economy or the
new economy. To others, this claim of structural change is the result of hype and mis–perception,
as it is argued that change is always with us and that recent history is simply a reflection of that
fact. It is clearly important to know whether a structural change has indeed occurred since in
the absence of such a change past experience is a good guide for current policy, while this may
not be true after a structural change.
In this paper, we highlight how cross–country comparisons in economic performance can be
used to gain insight regarding whether we have recently experience a structural change and, if
so, what is its nature. In particular, we use cross–country comparisons to explore three main
questions. First, we want to examine whether cross–country data indicates the occurrence of
structural change sometime in the last few decades. Second, if we have witnessed a structural
change, we want to isolate the country–specific factors that explain why different countries have
adjusted differently to the situation. Third, we want to identify the most plausible candidate
for a common force driving the change.
The issue we face is a substantial identification problem, requiring something akin to detective
work to solve. To understand the nature of the problem and our approach to the solution,
consider an heuristic example. Suppose that every night we set out chairs on a patio and every
morning we find them in disarray. There are two possible forces that could be causing the
upheaval. One is regular high winds that happen every night but with greatly varying intensity.
The other is the arrival of a vandal who sneaks in and rearranges the chairs. Recently, there has
been a substantial increase in the extent of the upheaval and we would like to know which force is
responsible. Some claim that the winds are going through a regular, periodic surge while others
argue that it is a new and destructive vandal at work. The difficulty is that, since it happens
at night, we cannot observe the forces and, as a result, cannot directly identify the culprit. One
response to this problem is to identify the culprit using a combination of data and theory, as is
done in detective work. There are theories about regular wind patterns, the actions of vandals
and the physics of chair movements. Thus, by using theory and by comparing recent patterns
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of chairs with patterns observed in the past, one can likely identify the culprit. Of course, such
an identification scheme will not always be complete since the winds and vandals can interact
in ways that are likely difficult to untangle. Nonetheless, one should be able to make strong
statements about what is compatible with what we know from theory of winds and the vandals.
Analogously to this example, our approach in this paper will be to use cross-country observation
on growth patterns to examine the plausibility of the structural change hypothesis.1
The key implication from the above example is that even in the absence of direct observations
on driving forces, one can use theory to guide empirical work as a means of making headway
on the issue of differentiating structural change from ongoing change. Thus, in the first section
of the paper, we present a very simple model of structural change that illustrates the type of
empirical patterns that one should expect in the presence of technological paradigm shifts. The
model is based on the adjustment process associated with the arrival and dissemination of a
new means of production2, and it highlights what to look for when trying to identify structural
change using cross–country data. It also illustrates how to approach the data in order to extract
pertinent information regarding the process and speed of adjustment to change. The basic insight
from the model is that counties with different demographic profiles, as captured by different
rates of population growth, should exhibit systematic differences in growth patterns during the
adjustment process induced by a structural change in technology. As we will discuss, our simple
theory implies that the role of population growth in affecting economic performance changes
radically in times of structural change in comparison with more normal periods. This suggests
searching for drastic and predictable change in the causal relationships between population
growth and output–growth as a means of identifying structural change.
This paper builds on our previous work, and that of others, aimed at understanding recent
changes in the economy. We have been working on this research project, together or in pairs, for
several years. During this time, our view of how cross–country comparisons can be used to gain
insight regarding economic change has evolved in response to an interaction between theory and
data. Our impetus for focusing on cross–country comparisons is motivated by the recognition
that structural change, whether it be due to a change in technological paradigm or to the forces
1The detective approach we adopt is admittedly indirect. One potential alternative approach would be to use
a proxy for the forces being studied. For example, we might consider using patents as a stand-in for technological
change. We do not follow this approach for two reasons. First, the proxies themselves are often endogenous:
incentives to file patents may differ over an innovative cycle. Second, what may seem like a small direct effect
may hide much larger ultimate impacts. In particular, we believe that it is not the size of the change per say, for
example the depth of a scientific discovery, that defines whether there has been structural change; but instead, it
is the response and subsequent functioning of the economy that defines such change. In our example, we might
find foot prints from the vandal and note that they have changed in size. If the change is only slight then we
might conclude that the change in vandal cannot account for the much larger disarray. But a slightly larger
person might have much larger effects depending on the nature of the chairs and the patio.
2Similar insights can be drawn from a model that emphasizes a major change in the trade opportunities as in
show in Beaudry and Collard [2004]
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of globalization, is a general equilibrium phenomena and, therefore, that the country is likely an
appropriate unit of analysis. Initially, in Beaudry and Green [1998,2000,2003], we questioned
whether changes in the wage structure observed in Canada and the US over the 1980’s and
1990’s was simply the reflection of an ongoing, exogenous technological change, as emphasized
by a large segment of the literature, or if instead it was a reflection of a more drastic change in
technological paradigm. In these papers, we used and refined models of endogenous technological
adoption to articulate how one could evaluate such claims. Our results, based on wage data
for Canada, the US, Germany and the UK, supported the notion that this period most likely
reflected a major change in paradigm, where the speed of change was endogenous to country
specific factors. In particular, we emphasized the role of capital deepening in this process, and
especially the effect of demographics and physical capital deepening. In subsequent work, we
wanted to look at a broader set of countries and over a longer time span in order to better
assess the robustness of our previous findings, as well as to better isolate the extent of change
and its timing. This objective led us to focus on patterns of output growth across countries (i.e.
output–per–worker) instead of wage patterns since such data is more widely available. We began
by examining the extent to which the patterns of output growth across OECD countries were
suggestive of a major change in technological paradigm (Beaudry and Green [2002], Beaudry
and Collard [2003]). Once again, we found that the data patterns conformed rather well to the
predictions of a model of an endogenous switch in techniques of production. In more recent
work, we have extended our exploration to include both developed and developing countries
(Beaudry, Collard and Green [2004]), and we have explored the potential role of globalization
(Beaudry and Collard [2004]) as an alternative explanation for the observed transformations.
The current paper brings together some methodological and empirical insights we have drawn
from our previous work, as well as providing a more up–to–date treatment of the data. As will
become clear, we believe that the data strongly suggest that, over the period 1960-2002, we
witnessed a period of technologically driven structural change, as believed by many, but that
the nature of the change appears at odds with many pre–conceptions. Moreover, we will show
that demographics appear to have played a central role in explaining how different countries
have adjusted to the change. As for interpreting the nature of the observed structural change,
we present at the end of the paper our preferred interpretation of the observations. However,
at this time, we recognize that our preferred interpretation involves a substantial amount of
conjecture and therefore still calls for more research.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In Section 1, we present a model
of technologically induced structural change which motivates our approach to the data. The
main observation that we will derive from the model is that during a period of technological
transition, the relationship between growth and demographics is likely to change radically and
in a predictable fashion. In Section 2, we present a series of empirical results based on the
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co–movement of output growth and population growth aimed at examining whether we have
likely witnessed a structural change somewhere over the period 1960–2002. In this section, we
report results based on comparing economic performance across major OECD countries as well
as results based on a much wider set of countries. In Section 4, we reassess the value of the model
of technological revolution presented in Section 1 and offer a modified version which appears
more consistent with a larger set of observation. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications
of our research for a set of policy issues.
1 A Model of Technological Transition
In this section we present a multi–country model consisting of a set of small open economies that
all produce the same final good, which can be either consumed or invested. Our objective with
this model is to illustrate how the emergence of a new technological paradigm causes a structural
break in the process determining growth. The model is similar in spirit to that presented, for
example, in Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997].3 In particular, we will use the model to show
how the arrival of a new mode of production (i.e. a General Purpose Technology)4 generates a
drastic change in the relationship between labour productivity growth and population growth. In
Section 2, we exploit this implication of the model to motivate our exploration of the time varying
relationship between labour productivity growth and population growth as a means of searching
for a possible technology–induced structural change. Hence this theoretical section provides
guidance on how to approach data to evaluate the occurrence of a technological revolution.
1.1 The Economy in a pre–Technological Revolution Era
Consider an economy comprised of a large number of identical households, each of which derives
utility from the consumption, c(t), of an homogenous good. The household’s utility function
takes the form
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c(t))L(t)dt (1)
where ρ > 0 is a constant discount factor, u(c(t)) is the per person utility in period t, and
L(t) is the size of dynasty in year t. The latter is assumed to move in the same manner as the
population of the economy as a whole, according to
L˙(t) = nL(t)
where n > 0 is the constant population rate of growth, and L(0) > 0 is given.
3Also see Aghion and Howitt [1998] and Caselli [1999].
4See Bresnahan and Trajtenberg [1995] or Helpman and Trajtenberg [1998].
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In every period, each household is assumed to supply inelastically L(t) units of labour at the
real wage rate wo(t).5 The household owns the capital stock, Ko(t), and rents it to firms at a
real rate, qo(t). Each household has access to international capital markets and holds foreign
bonds, B(t), which yield a rate of return equal to the world real interest rate r. These revenues
are used to purchase new bonds, investment, Io(t), and consumption goods. The household
therefore faces the following budget constraint.
B˙(t) + c(t)L(t) + Io(t) = wo(t)L(t) + rB(t) + qo(t)Ko(t) (2)
Investment purchases are then used to form the capital stock according to
K˙o(t) = Io(t)− δKo(t) (3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation of capital and Ko(0) > 0 is given. Investment is
specific to the technology and assumed to be irreversible and, thus, Io(t) > 0 .
Each household determines its optimal consumption/savings plans by maximizing (1) subject
to (2) and (3).
The homogenous good is produced using capital,Ko(t), and labour, L(t), according to a constant
returns to scale technology represented by the following production function
Y o(t) = Ko(t)αL(t)1−α (4)
where α ∈ (0, 1). In order to keep notation to a minimum, we abstract from labour augmenting
technological progress, but all results survive when we take it into account. Optimal production
plans are then determined by maximizing profits.
Since households have access to international capital markets and since we are considering a
small open economy, the equilibrium capital–labour ratio, ko(t) = Ko(t)/L(t) is given by6
ko(t) =
(
α
r + δ
) 1
1−α
therefore, output–per–worker is given by
y(t) =
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
From this last equation, we immediately derive the following proposition.
5Note that the “o” superscript corresponds to “old”, to distinguish prices and quantities associated with the
initial, or old, technology from those that will be associated with the new technology, the introduction of which
is the focus of our study.
6A technical appendix, downloadable from http://fabcol.free.fr, gives a more formal statement of all the
results.
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Proposition 1 In the pre–technological revolution era, population growth exerts no effect on the
equilibrium path of labour productivity.
This is a result common to many simple growth models.
1.2 The Economy during a Technological Revolution
We now assume that in period t = t⋆, the economy experiences an unexpected technological
revolution, in the sense that the economy has access to a new means of production which is
more productive than the old technology. This technology produces an amount, Y n(t), of the
same homogenous good as was produced in the pre–technological revolution era using technol-
ogy specific capital, Kn(t), and skilled workers, S(t), according to a constant returns–to–scale
technology represented by the production function
Y n(t) = Kn(t)α((1 + γ)S(t))1−α (5)
where γ > 0 fully captures the technological improvement from using skilled labour in the new
technology relative to using unskilled labour, L(t), in the old technology. The representative firm
now has the choice between using the earlier technology or the new technology. This arbitrage
is made by maximizing current profits
Y o(t) + Y n(t)− qo(t)Ko(t)− wo(t)Lo(t)− qn(t)Kn(t)− wn(t)S(t)
The introduction of the new technology leaves households preferences unchanged. It does,
however, affect households decisions. In particular, households must now to decide whether
to continue working in the old technology or to opt for a training program which will allow
them to obtain the skills necessary to take part in the new technology. Workers are assumed
to be unproductive when in a firm’s training program, with individuals in training having a
instantaneous probability Ω > 0 of becoming a skilled worker at any point in during training.
We also assume that new entrants in the labour market come into the market at a skill level
proportional to the other individuals in the economy. This assumption eliminates any steady
state effect of population growth and can be justified on the grounds of social learning. We
assume that this spill–over effect of skill to new entrants plays out at the aggregate level and is
therefore not internalized by the household. This implies that the stock of skilled workers, S(t)
evolves according to the relationship:
S˙(t) = ΩH(t) + ns(t)L(t) (6)
where H(t) is the number of individuals in training and s(t) is the fraction of skilled individuals
in the population, that is, s(t) = S(t)
L(t) . The remaining L(t) −H(t) − S(t) workers work in the
old technology.
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The main assumption we make about the new technology and the associated training process
is that Ωγ > r. This condition guarantees that it is profitable for firms to adopt the new
technology and for workers to be willing to be trained to obtain the new skills.7
When the new technology has become available, the old capital still evolves as in (3) and the
law of motion for the new capital stock is given by
K˙n(t) = In(t)− δKn(t) (7)
where just as in the old technology, investment In(t) must be greater than zero because of
irreversibility.
The household’s budget constraint now becomes
B˙(t)+c(t)L(t)+In(t)+Io(t) = rB(t)+wo(t)(L(t)−S(t)−E(t))+wn(t)S(t)+qo(t)Ko(t)+qn(t)Kn(t)
(8)
Each household determines its optimal consumption/savings plans by maximizing (1) subject
to (3), (6), (7) and (8).
Given that the household faces a fixed interest rate on the international capital market, the
household’s optimal allocation of time between training and working can be reduced to the
following optimization (problem stated in intensive form),8
max
{h(t),s(t)}∞
t=t⋆
∫ ∞
t⋆
e−(r−n)(t−t
⋆) (wo(t)(1− h(t)− s(t)) + wn(t)s(t)) dt
subject to
s˙(t) = Ωh(t) + ns(t) (9)
where, s(t) = S(t)/L(t).
The first order conditions for this problem are
wo(t) = Ωµ(t)
µ˙(t) = −(wn(t)− wo(t)) + rµ(t)
where µ(t) is the shadow price associated with being a skilled worker. Since the new capital
stock can be financed on the international capital market at rate r+δ, it implies that the capital
labour ratio in the new technology, and therefore the wage rate, are constant. In particular, it
implies that the wage paid to skill workers is:
wn(t) = (1− α)(1 + γ)
(
α
r + ϕ
) α
1−α
7The intuition behind this condition is rather simple. Since effort to become a skilled worker translates into a
marginal increase in productivity of magnitude γ, and this occurs with probability Ω,. Thus, this condition states
that the expected discounted gains of becoming a skilled worker over the entire life cycle have to be greater than
1.
8See the technical appendix for details.
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Then from the optimality conditions for the allocation of labour, it follows that the wage paid
in the traditional technology is given by
wo(t) =
Ω
r +Ω
wn(t)
Since wo(t) will also be equal to the marginal productivity of labour in the old technology, this
implies that the fraction of workers in training is given by
h(t) = 1− s(t)−
(
r +Ω
Ωθ
) 1
α
ko(t)
Therefore, the evolution of skilled labour for (t > t⋆) is equal to:
s(t) = 1− e−Ωt −
Ω
Ω− δ − n
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1
α
(
r + δ
α
) 1
1−α
k(t⋆)
(
e−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆) − e−Ω(t−t
⋆)
)
(10)
Given the dynamics of skill and of training, the dynamics of output–per–worker during the
technological transition (t > t⋆) can be directly derived form the production functions and is
given by
y(t) =(1 + γ)
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
+
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1
α (1 + γ)(r + δ)
α
(
Ω
r +Ω
−
Ω
Ω− δ − n
)
ko(t⋆)e−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆)
+ (1 + γ)
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(
Ω
Ω− δ − n
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1
α
(
r + δ
α
) 1
1−α
ko(t⋆)− 1
)
e−Ω(t−t
⋆)
where k(t⋆) denotes the capital-labour ratio in the old technology at time t⋆.
We are then in a position to characterize the effects of introducing the new technology.
Proposition 2 Starting from the steady state of the economy where only the old technology is
available, the introduction of the new technology triggers a temporary drop in labour productivity.
This proposition is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 1 which depicts the evolution of labour
productivity before and after the introduction of the new technological paradigm. In this fig-
ure, we report typical time paths for output–per–worker for both a country with a zero rate of
population growth and a country with a positive rate of population growth. In both economies,
labour productivity initially drops after the introduction of the new technology and then recov-
ers to a higher level. In the pre–transition period, t ∈ (0, t⋆), only the old technology is available
and labour productivity is essentially determined by the world real interest rate, as indicated in
Proposition 1. Therefore, during this period, there are no differences between economies with
high and low population growth. As soon as the new technology is introduced, labour produc-
tivity drops in each economy as indicated in panel (a). The explanation for this phenomenon
is simple and is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure plots the evolution of the number of indi-
viduals choosing to be trained (panel (a)) and the evolution of skilled labour (panel (b)) during
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Figure 1: Output during a Technological Transition
t* Time
(a) Labor Productivity
n=0
n>0
t*
(b) Differences in Labor Productivity
Time
Figure 2: Training and Skilled Labour during a Technological Transition
(a) Training
Time
n=0
n>0
(b) Skilled Labor
Time
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the technological transition. As Figure 2 illustrates, as soon the new technology is introduced,
households move from working with the old technology to training. This is so because training is
the only way for workers to become skilled and eventually take advantage of a higher real wage
in the new technology. The result is that fewer workers are operative in the old technology and,
in consequence, output drops. Another phenomenon is also taking place during this transition.
The rental rate of capital served by the old technology is lower than in the new technology.
There is therefore no incentive for the household to keep investing in the old capital stock,
which simply depreciates. This effect reinforces the pattern generated due to skill upgrading
and explains why labour productivity keeps on decreasing for so long. When the new technology
is widely adopted, the process reverses and labour productivity regains strength.
It is worth noting that this process does not take place at the same speed in the two economies,
as the next proposition makes clear.
Proposition 3 After the introduction of the new technology, the higher population growth country
will first experience less growth in labour productivity than a lower population growth country,
followed by a period of higher growth.
In panel (b) of Figure 1 we plot the (log) labour productivity differential between economies
with high and low population rates of growth after the introduction of the new technology. The
pattern displayed in this Figure indicates that the economy with the highest population growth
initially performs less well in terms of labour productivity than the other economy. Underlying
this, as is evident from panel (a) of Figure 2, is the fact that the economy with the highest
rate of population growth allocates more workers to training in the earlier periods of adoption
of the new technology. This occurs because that economy is less tempted to remain in the
old technology since the effective depreciation rate (δ + n) of the old capital–labour ratio is
greater in the economy with high population growth. In other words, the relative importance
of the old capital stock in the economy is decreasing faster in the high population growth
economies. Therefore, this economy forms skilled workers at a faster pace, implying that it has
fewer productive workers in the early stages of the transition. Hence, in the earlier periods of the
adoption process, the high population growth economy loses more in terms of productivity than
the low population growth economy. But this eventually reverses itself since both economies
are converging toward the same steady state. Indeed, over time, the high population growth
economy takes advantage of its earlier training efforts and implements the new technology at
a faster pace as more skilled labour becomes available. It, therefore, eventually experiences a
period of faster growth.9
9Throughout this process, the accumulation of capital specific to the new technology is growing faster in the
high population growth economy since this capital stock is proportional to the number of skilled workers.
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2 Examining Growth Patterns
The model of the previous section suggests that if there is a structural change due to the arrival
and dissemination of a new technological paradigm, then the growth patterns observed in a
country during such a transition period will be affected by its demographic characteristics. In
particular, the model indicates that, in comparison with a low population growth country, a
country with a higher rate of population growth will first experience worst growth outcomes
after the arrival of the new technological paradigm followed, later, by better growth outcomes.
In contrast, before the technological transition (i.e. in normal times), the model has the property
that growth outcomes are unrelated to a country demographics. The model therefore suggests a
way of exploring whether a set of countries has been subject to a major technological paradigm
shift by looking at whether there has been a major change in the relationship between output
growth and population growth. To be more precise, the model suggests that if the arrival of the
new technology is at time t⋆, and that time 0 is the initial date in our data set, then
∀t < t⋆, Corr
(
(log y(t)− log y(0))
t
,
(logL(t)− logL(0))
t
)
= 0
and
∀t > t⋆, Corr
(
(log y(t)− log y(t⋆))
(t− t⋆)
,
(logL(t)− logL(t⋆))
(t− t⋆)
)
6= 0
where, y(t) = Y (t)
L(t) .
Based on these predictions, we can test the key implications of the model in a regression frame-
work. In particular, consider a simple structural change model given by:
∀t < t⋆,
(log y(t)− log y(0))
t
= α0t + α1
(logL(t)− logL(0))
t
+ α2X(t) + ε(t)
and
∀t > t⋆,
(log y(t)− log y(t⋆))
(t− t⋆)
= β0t + β1t
(logL(t)− logL(t⋆))
(t− t⋆)
+ β2X(t) + ε(t)
where X is a set of other variables that may affect growth. Stated in the context of these
regressions, the model has three key implications: (i) that a well defined t⋆ (or small possible
range for t⋆ ) exists and is evident in the data; (ii) α1 = 0 and (iii) the β1t’s are significantly
different from zero and imply a time varying pattern similar to that depicted in Figure 1.
The main difficulty in examining these model implications is determining an appropriate value
for t⋆. Once we assign that value, testing the implications for the α1 and β1t parameters is
straightforward. Indeed, testing for whether there is a structural break of the kind described
here is also straightforward given a particular hypothesized value for t⋆. However, we are partly
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interested in uncovering where any such structural break might lie in the data. To accomplish
this, we estimate the preceding system of equations for every possible value of t⋆ from 1960
to the end of the sample. In each case, we construct a set of fitted values for log(y) from our
estimates and then calculate the sum of squared prediction errors. We are interested in whether
a plot of these sums of squared prediction errors from the whole set of possible structural break
points indicates that there is a clear candidate (or range of candidates) for a structural break.
We then proceed by taking that candidate as given and test the model implications for the α1
and β1t parameters.
10
We begin our examination by focusing on the experience of the major industrialized countries
over the period 1960–2002.11 We choose to focus only on the richest countries since it is a set for
which assuming common access to frontier technological opportunities appears most plausible.
The 17 countries forming our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and the United States. The data are taken from the 6.0 version of the World
Penn Tables and the OECD statistical compendium. In particular, the output data is taken from
the World Penn Tables to assure international comparability12, while employment and labour
force data are taken from the OECD statistical compendium. Details of data construction are
presented in appendix A.13 The measure we use for L(t) is the population aged 15 to 64. An
alternative measure for L(t) would be the countries labor force. However, since labour market
participation decision may respond to variations in economic growth, we chose to focus on adult
population measure of L(T ) since it is more likely exogenous to the phenomena examined. Let
us nevertheless note that we get similar results using the size of the labour force as an alternative
measure for L(t) and we will show some of those results below.
In Figure 3, we present the sum of squared prediction errors described above. The horizontal
axis corresponds to the sequence of values for t⋆ we examine, while the vertical axis corresponds
to the value of the sum of squared prediction errors. The only additional variable we include in
the underlying regressions (i.e. variables in X) is the initial level of output–per–worker in each
10Our approach is in the spirit of, though not exactly the same as, using a series of rolling F–tests for structural
breaks. In our case, the dependent variable is redefined at each potential value for t⋆ because the growth rate after
the structural break is normalized relative to the value of log(y) at t⋆. This means the F–statistics corresponding
to testing for the existence of a structural break are not directly comparable across different values for t⋆. Our
response to this is to examine the implications of differing potential structural break points for fitting the common
underlying series: log(y) .
11We choose countries with more than a million people and with GDP–per–capita in 1980 greater than 50% of
the US level. We found it natural to cut the sample at this point since it is where there was a rather large break
in the data. For example, the next richest industrialized countries had per–capita–incomes below one third of the
US level in 1980.
12The data in version 6.0 of the WPT ends in 1999. We extended the data to 2002 using data from the OECD.
13Note that in the World Penn data, employment is proxied by the number of people between the ages of 15
and 64. Since this is a poor proxy for employment, we do not use this proxy in constructing output–per–worker
but instead use the employment data available in the OECD statistical compendium.
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sub–sample. However, the results depicted in this figure are robust to including many other
variables that may affect growth. The figure indicates a clear minimum of the model selection
criterion in the 1975 to 1978 range. Thus, the first implication of the model (that there is a
well defined year or a small range of years in which a structural break occurred) is confirmed in
the data. The other implications are also met in the data. In particular, setting the structural
break at any year in the 1975 to 1978 range, we cannot reject the restriction that α1 equals zero
at any conventional significance level (p–value=0.49 when t⋆ = 1975 and 0.88 when t⋆ = 1978),
while the set of β1t, t = (t
⋆, 2002), are jointly significantly different from zero (p-value<0.01 for
both t⋆ = 1975 and 1978).14
Figure 3: Model Selection (Population 15–64)
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Of course, the model predictions are stronger than just a zero impact of population growth
before the structural change and some non–zero impact after the change: it implies a specific
post–change relationship depicted in Figure 1. To examine those implications, and to further
illustrate the relationship between output growth and population growth before and after our
estimated t⋆ (i.e. between 1975 and 1978), we plot the estimated cumulative effect of a one
percent difference in population growth on labour–productivity in Figure 4 . Specifically, in the
left panel of Figure 4,we report the sequence of α1t ’s obtained by estimating the regression
log y(t)− log y(1960)
t
= α0t+ α1t(logL(t)− logL(1960)) + α2 t× log y(1960) + ε(t)
14The corresponding p–values when we use growth in the labour force rather than growth in population as the
key right hand side regressor are: 0.79 when t⋆ = 1975 and 0.38 when t⋆ = 1978 for α1, and 0.00 for both t
⋆ =
1975 and 1978 for the β1t’s
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Figure 4: The Cumulative Effect of 1% Population Growth on Output–per–Worker
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Note: The gray line corresponds to a fourth order polynomial of time fitted on the series of time varying coefficients.
for t = 1961 to 1978. The solid dark line in the figure corresponds to the estimated set of α1t’s.
The grey line corresponds to a fourth order polynomial in time fitted to the α1t series in order to
ease interpretation of potential trends, and the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence
interval around the estimated effects. The α1t’s capture the effects of annualized population
growth rates on annualized growth rates in output as we move forward, year by year, from 1960.
It is clear from the figure that population growth had essentially zero impact on output growth
throughout this period. In contrast, in the right panel of the figure, we plot the same the type of
sequence of estimates, but now starting in 1975 instead and letting t go from 1976 to 2002. The
estimated effects of population growth on output performance were substantially different over
this period. In particular, the point estimates indicate that a country with a one percent rate
of population growth over the period 1975 to 1995 experiences 15% less growth in output–per–
worker over the same period relative to a country with zero population growth. The declines
from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s are statistically significant at any conventional significance
level. Then, starting in 1995, we see that the process starts to reverse itself as the negative
effect of population growth decreases, indicating faster growth for the high population growth
countries after 1995.15 What is perhaps most striking about this figure is its concurrence with
the pattern generated from our theoretical model after the introduction of a new technology.
The key implication from this initial set of regressions is that population growth played an
important role in shaping medium–run growth in output-per-worker over the 1978–1995 period.
It is interesting to note that this pattern is evident even in the simplest plots of the data.
Thus, Figure 5 reports the relationship between annualized labour productivity growth and the
15Computing the same test as the one reported in Figure 3 but starting in 1978, we find another break in 1995.
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annualized rate of growth of population aged between 15 and 64 for the period 1978 to 1995.
Figure 5: Labour Productivity Growth and Population (15–64) Growth
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The figure reveals a very strong negative correlation between these variables over this period.
This is confirmed by the examination of the slope coefficient from a regression of the change in
output–per–worker on population growth, which is -0.94 with a standard error of 0.22.
As discussed earlier, we carry out our main investigations by examining the impacts of the rates
of growth of the non–dependent age (15–64) population to avoid potential endogeneity issues
that would arise from using actual labour force growth. Nonetheless, the model is actually
written in terms of labour force growth and it is interesting to see whether the same patterns
arise when we use a direct measure of the labour force. To this end, in Figure 6 we repeat the
plot from Figure 5 but replace population growth with labour force growth. The results again
show a very strong negative relationship, indicating that our use of population growth is not
altering the key underlying patterns.
The combination of Figure 3 and Figure 4 suggests that the relationship between output and
population growth over the last 40 years differs within three sub–periods: 1960 to the late 1970s,
the late 1970s to the mid–1990s, and the mid–1990s to the present. To provide a more concise
description of the relationship within these periods, we report the estimates from regressions
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Figure 6: Labour Productivity Growth and Labour Force Growth
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of output growth on population growth and the initial level of output for the three periods,
1960–78, 1978–95 and 1995–2002 in Table 1. At the bottom of the table we report the p-values
associated with tests of the null hypotheses that the slope parameters in the regressions do not
change between the 1960–78 and 1978–95 periods (reported at the bottom of the second column
of estimates) and that they do not change between the 1978–1995 and 1995–2002 periods (at the
bottom of the third column). We report both on tests that all slope parameters do not change
and that just the population growth rate parameter did not change.
Table 1: Baseline Regression (Pop 15–64)
1960–1978 1978–1995 1995–2002
Cst. 0.132 0.047 0.002
( 0.018) ( 0.026) ( 0.044)
(Y/L)0 -0.033 -0.006 0.002
( 0.006) ( 0.008) ( 0.011)
∆N -0.038 -0.846 0.402
( 0.249) ( 0.246) ( 0.390)
R2 0.74 0.54 0.07
Q(Total) – 0.016 0.002
Q(∆N) – 0.016 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. The stability test lines report the p–value of the test.
The results in the table accord closely with what we saw in Figure 4. In particular, the impact of
population growth on output growth is small and statistically insignificant in the 1960–78 period
but becomes large and highly significant in the second period. The apparent turn–around in this
relationship after the mid-1990s that is discernable in Figure 4 is confirmed by the population
growth coefficient in the 1995–2002 regression becoming positive and relatively substantial in
size. However, due to the shortness of this last sub–period, this effect is not well–defined and the
conclusion that the process has reversed itself remains more a tantalizing suggestion than some-
thing in which we can place strong faith. The stability tests at the bottom of the table indicate
statistically significant (at the 5% significance level) changes in the population parameter be-
tween both the first and second and between the second and third periods. Thus, we can make
a strong case that the relationship between output and population growth changed radically
after about 1978 and appears to have changed again after 1995, though given the imprecision
of estimates in the last period it is hard to be sure whether the relationship has reversed sign
or just been reduced in magnitude. Because of this uncertainty, reflected in a tendency for
regression coefficients for the 1995–2002 period to be unstable across specifications, we focus on
the two earlier periods (1960–1978 and 1978–1995) in the remainder of this section.16 Finally,
16We could, alternatively, combine examine the whole post–1978 period as one unit. Doing this does not have a
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the coefficient on initial period output–per–worker, which is intended to capture convergence
effects, is of about the order of magnitude seen in earlier studies in the pre–1978 period but
becomes much smaller, as well as statistically insignificant, after 1978. Thus, we move from a
period in which standard convergence processes play an important role in determining output
growth and population growth plays essentially no role to one in which the reverse is true.
The results in Figure 4 and Table 1 represent the basic patterns in the data. However, it is
possible that the population growth variable is really capturing the effects of other determinants
of growth and, so, we want to check the robustness of the conclusions we have presented so
far to the inclusion in our growth regressions of other sets of variables that are often hypoth-
esized to affect growth. As a first step, in Table 2 we introduce variables capturing physical
and human capital effects. In particular, in the first two columns, we present estimates from
a regression specification that extends that in Table 1 by bringing in the investment to GDP
ratio — a standard variable in a Solow growth model. The investment rate variable does not
enter significantly in either period and the conclusions from the previous table are unchanged.
In particular, the growth rate of population moves from being small and statistically significant
in the first period to being large, negative and highly significant in the second. In a second
pass, we control for human capital types of effects. Indeed, human capital is thought by most
economists to be one of the most prominent factors contributing to growth (see Uzawa [1965]
or Lucas [1988]). Furthermore, in their seminal paper, Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992] argue
that the data fitting properties of the neoclassical growth model are greatly enhanced by in-
cluding both types of capital — physical and human. Although this finding has been challenged
(see Durlauf and Quah [1999] or Klenow and Rodr`ıguez-Clare [1997] for discussions), education
clearly remains an important factor that deserves attention. Therefore, in the third and fourth
columns, we introduce a human capital variable (average years of schooling) in the specification.
Our main findings regarding the importance of population growth over the second period remain
unchanged. The only real difference is that the human capital variable itself enters significantly
(though with what might be viewed as a perverse sign) in the pre–1978 period and the pre–1978
population growth coefficient is of greater magnitude, though still highly statistically insignif-
icant. Nonetheless, the key conclusion that the impact of population growth went from being
insignificant before 1978 to strong and negative after 1978 does not change with the introduction
of controls for investment in physical and human capital.
We continue with our robustness investigation by seeing whether the large population effect in
the 1978–95 period stands up to the inclusion of other variables. Earlier papers have suggested
that institutions play an important role in economic growth and that, in particular, Anglo–Saxon
substantial effect on our conclusions. However, we believe there is a strong possibility that something has changed
after 1995 and lumping this period in with the 1978–1995 period would then be lead to misrepresentations of the
key patterns.
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Table 2: Robustness of Timing
1960–1978 1978–1995 1960–1978 1978–1995
Cst. 0.128 0.017 0.225 0.011
( 0.048) ( 0.043) ( 0.059) ( 0.055)
(Y/L)0 -0.033 -0.003 -0.035 -0.003
( 0.008) ( 0.008) ( 0.007) ( 0.008)
∆N -0.043 -0.849 0.268 -0.883
( 0.254) ( 0.240) ( 0.260) ( 0.312)
I/Y 0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.006
( 0.009) ( 0.007) ( 0.009) ( 0.007)
H – – -0.034 0.002
( 0.015) ( 0.013)
R2 0.74 0.56 0.81 0.57
Q(Total) – 0.034 – 0.012
Q(∆N) – 0.018 – 0.005
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. The stability test lines report the p–value of the test.
institutions are strongly related to good growth outcomes. An inspection of Figure 5 might lead
a reader to wonder whether that is what we are really picking up in our estimates since there is
a cluster of Anglo–Saxon countries in the bottom right (high population growth–low economic
growth) corner of the figure. To assess this, we re–estimated our initial specification including for
a dummy variable for predominantly Anglo Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
United Kingdom and the USA), denoted as. The estimates, presented in the first column of
Table 3, reveal a coefficient of zero on the Anglo–Saxon dummy variable and no effect on the
large estimated population growth effect. In columns 2 and 3, we also try introducing a dummy
variable for Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), denoted sc, first on its
own and then in combination with the Anglo–Saxon dummy. The inclusion of the Scandinavian
dummy does reduces the population growth effect somewhat, even though it is not statistically
significant in its own right. Nonetheless, the basic conclusion that the population growth rate
is a large, negative and statistically significant determinant of economic growth in this period
does not change. As an alternative approach to controlling for institutional impacts, we next
include the percentage change in country’s unemployment rate as an additional regressor. This
experiment addresses whether the high correlation between productivity growth and population
growth could simply be the result of certain labour market policies which may have favored
labour productivity at the cost of increasing unemployment.17 In such a case, technological
adoption, as discussed in section 1, would not be a relevant candidate explanation for the type
of phenomenon we are documenting. The results from this specification, reported in column
4, indicate that the introduction of the change in unemployment does not affect the observed
17See Blanchard [1997] for a discussion along these lines.
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Table 3: Robustness (1978–1995)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Cst 0.047 0.041 0.041 0.068 0.048 0.038
( 0.026) ( 0.025) ( 0.025) ( 0.025) ( 0.026) ( 0.028)
(Y/L)0 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011 -0.007 -0.003
( 0.008) ( 0.007) ( 0.007) ( 0.007) ( 0.007) ( 0.008)
∆N -0.854 -0.734 -0.772 -0.758 -0.820 -1.048
( 0.286) ( 0.248) ( 0.278) ( 0.218) ( 0.251) ( 0.290)
AS 0.000 – 0.001 – – –
( 0.003) ( 0.003)
SC – 0.004 0.004 – – –
( 0.003) ( 0.003)
∆U – – – -0.070 – –
( 0.031)
∆C/T – – – – 0.300 –
( 0.369)
∆E/T – – – – 0.137 –
( 0.161)
R2 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.65 0.58 –
F – – – – – 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. F is the p–value associated
with the excluded instrumental variables test.
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negative correlation between labour force growth and labour productivity growth, although the
effect of changes in unemployment is itself significant.
Yet another potential interpretation of our results is that we are really picking up changes in
the age structure of populations, something which has recently been argued is a determinant
of growth (see e.g. Feyrer [2002]). To investigate this possibility, we estimate a specification,
including two age structure variables. The first variable is the percentage change in the ratio
of the number of children under age 15 to the population as a whole, denoted ∆(C/T ). The
second variable corresponds to the percentage change in the ratio of the elderly (people over age
65) to the total population, denoted ∆(E/T ). The results from this specification are reported
in column 5. The age structure variables themselves do not enter statistically significantly and,
more importantly for our discussion, also do not change the result that population growth is
strongly negatively related to output growth in this period. Finally, there may be some concern
that over extended time periods, population growth may be endogenously related to economic
growth, particularly to the extent that immigration and emigration flows respond to changes
in the economic fortunes of an economy. To address this, we instrument for population growth
using the average annual population growth for the given country in the beginning of the previous
period (1960–1970). Essentially, this means we are checking whether persistently high population
growth countries fared particularly poorly in the 1978–1995 period. This instrument is valid
if we assume that demographic decisions in the previous 20 years were not based on accurate
predictions of patterns of economic growth after 1978. Given our evidence that there was a
structural change in the growth process around 1978, this seems like a reasonable assumption.
Note, also, that one might be concerned that there might be a permanent country–specific
effect that relates to both economic performance and population growth. Such an effect, if not
controlled for, would render this instrumental variables strategy ineffective, since the instrument
would also reflect that effect. However, we have already conditioned on such effects by including
the start of period output–per–worker variable in our specifications.
The results from the instrumental variable specification, given in column 6, are stronger than
what we observed without instrumenting. In particular, the coefficient on the population growth
rate variable increases in magnitude from -0.846 to -1.048. The implication is that, if anything,
any endogeneity problems in the simple OLS estimation were causing us to under–estimate the
full impact of population growth on economic growth.
2.1 Results for the World
To this point, we have confined our analysis to a set of rich countries. We did this, in part,
as a means of controlling for other factors, such as political instability, that might confound
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our attempts to estimate basic underlying patterns of economic growth. However, we are also
interested in whether the patterns we have identified are only a developed world phenomenon
or show up in a broader sample of countries. To this end, we repeat our main investigation for
the full set of countries for which we have data throughout our data period. In the Penn World
tables, this amounts to 106 countries, for which there is data spanning the years 1960–1998.
Figure 7 reproduces Figure 4 using the whole world sample. The results from the two samples
Figure 7: The Cumulative Effect of 1% Population Growth on Output-per-Worker
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show strong similarities. In particular, in the pre–1978 period, we again see only limited effects
of population growth on economic growth. Though the estimates from the full world sample
show a dip in the population effect in the early 1970s and a slight negative trend in the effect
over the whole period, the implication from comparing the pre and post–1978 periods remains
the same: limited pre–1978 population effects are converted into much more substantial effects
after 1978. In the post–1978 period, we see the same evidence of a limited relationship up until
the early to mid–1980s followed by a sharp increase (in absolute value) in the estimated effects.
The drop is much more substantial than what was observed for our restricted sample and there
is no evidence of a slow down or turn–around in the trend after 1995. It is worth noting, though,
that this sample only runs to 1998 and, thus, may simply miss any potential turn–around. Thus,
the overall pattern of differences before and after 1978 is, if anything, even stronger in the whole
world sample.
These rough impressions from the figure are confirmed in regression analysis. Table 4 contains
estimates of our basic specification and the physical and human capital robustness checks. We
again divide the sample in 1978 but allow the second period to run to 1998, which is the end of the
sample for this data. The results from the basic specification in the first two columns support our
discussion of the figures. The pre–1978 population growth effect is larger in absolute value than
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what was observed for the richer country sample but is still nowhere near statistical significance
at any conventional significance level. In contrast, the post–1978 population growth effect is
larger than what was observed in the smaller sample. It is also, again, statistically significantly
different from zero at any conventional significance level and negative. The test–statistics at
the bottom of the second column also indicate that there is no question that the impact of
population growth changed between the two periods. The other difference relative to the earlier
sample is that the initial output level has small and insignificant effects in both periods for the
whole world sample, while for the smaller sample of countries it had a significant coefficient in
the pre–1978 period. As in the results from the richer country sample, we check the robustness of
Table 4: Regression Analysis
1960–1978 1978–1998 1960–1978 1978–1998 1960–1978 1978–1998
Cst. 0.024 0.030 0.109 0.147 0.152 0.140
( 0.019) ( 0.020) ( 0.024) ( 0.024) ( 0.023) ( 0.029)
(Y/L)0 0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.015 -0.010
( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.003)
∆N -0.230 -0.976 -0.155 -0.806 -0.092 -0.808
( 0.214) ( 0.185) ( 0.192) ( 0.157) ( 0.166) ( 0.179)
I/Y – – 0.014 0.023 0.011 0.019
( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
H – – – – 0.017 0.008
( 0.003) ( 0.006)
R2 0.02 0.24 0.22 0.47 0.43 0.45
Q(Total) – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000
Q(∆N) – 0.004 – 0.006 – 0.002
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. The stability test lines report the p–value of the stability test.
There are 106 observations. When education is introduced as regressor, the number of observations is
86.
these results by introducing physical and human capital variables.18 Introducing the investment
rate variable reduces the size of the estimated population growth effects in both periods but
does not alter the overall pattern of an insignificant and relatively small effect before 1978 being
followed by a much larger and significant second period effect. In contrast to the results with the
smaller sample, the investment rate itself enters significantly and becomes significantly larger
in the second period than the first. This is in line with the results in Beaudry et al. [2004],
where we showed that, for a broad sample of countries, both population and investment effects
changed after 1978 and that this could explain the “hollowing–out” of the middle of the world
income distribution that occurred over this period. Finally, the results are similar when we
18Note that we have only 86 observations in the last specification reported in the table because of limitations
on education data.
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also introduce the human capital variable, with the only exception being that the convergence
parameter is now statistically significant in both periods. The education effect itself is significant
in the first period but insignificant and much smaller in the second period.
Overall, the results of these empirical investigations strongly support the notion of a structural
break that took place in the late 1970’s. That break is reflected in a switch from population
growth having no impact on economic growth patterns to it having large, statistically significant
and negative effects after 1978. Moreover, the pattern of the population effects varies over time
in a manner that is close concordance with the pattern our theoretical model predicts for a period
following the introduction of a major new technology. There is also some evidence of a turn–
around in the relationship between population and economic growth in the late 1990s. However,
while the basic pattern of no effect from population growth followed by a strong negative effect
is evident both in samples of countries covering the whole world and covering only rich countries,
the potential turn–around is only evident in the rich countries. Finally, these conclusions stand
up to substantial robustness checks, suggesting that this is a strong basic pattern in the data.
3 Interpretation
The concordance between the theory presented in Section 1 and the empirical patterns described
in Section 2 provide support for the view that (i) we have witnessed a major technological
revolution starting somewhere in the mid to late seventies, and (ii) demographic differences
across countries have been an important, and generally neglected, force driving the differential
growth performances across countries during this period. An important element of these results
is the duration of the patterns being described. The patterns plays out in a medium term time
frame: 20 to 30 years. This implies caution in trying to interpret patterns in the type of time
frames often examined in public discourse: the most recent 5 to 10 years. For example, some
observers have used comparisons of relative growth performance across countries since the mid
1990’s to argue that the relatively successful countries in that time frame have superior economic
and social policies. The ”American Miracle” of the late 1990’s, in particular, has been used in
this way. But the model and data presented here suggest that recent differences in growth may,
instead, simply reflect that demographic differences across countries have led them to adjust to
a technological revolution at different rates.
As emphasized above, the data patterns presented in Section 2 are surprisingly consistent with
the very simple model of a technological revolution presented in Section 1. Based on this, we
could decide to conclude the paper here since the data and model provide answers to most of
the questions paused in the introduction, that is, they offer answers to the questions: (i) have
we witnessed a structural break, (ii) what is the nature of the change and (iii) what explains
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the different outcomes across countries. However, we would like to take advantage of this forum
to discuss in some detail what we see as the way forward from here. That necessarily involves
the somewhat unconventional step of criticizing what we ourselves have done and suggesting
alternate solutions. Those potential solutions build on what we view as the important insights
gained from the model presented to this point but require modifications to that model to match
other patterns in the data.
In this spirit, we want to point out two shortcomings of the model of Section 1. First, a key
pattern in the data is the very long duration of the productivity slowdown that began in the
mid 1970’s and lasted at least until the mid 1990’s. Recall that in the model of Section 1, a
productivity slowdown arise because agents are investing to learn how to use the new technology.
Thus, a prolonged productivity slowdown implies particularly patient agents who are ready to
forego current income in order to invest the learning of new skills. In our quantitative exploration
of the model, we found that extremely low discount rates were need to reproduce the pattern
observed in the data. Since such low discount rates appeared unreasonable, it suggests to us a
need to adjust the model as to rely less on forward looking behavior. Second, the time paths
of the level of productivity for specific countries does not appear to match the model well. For
example, consider the time path of labour productivity observed in the US since 1947 as depicted
on Figure 8.
Figure 8: US Labour Productivity
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In this figure, we plot US labour productivity19 as well as two trend lines with identical slopes.
The first trend line passes through the points 1947 and 1973, while the second trend line passes
19This series is taken for the Bureau of Labour statistics and represents output-per-hour of work
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through the points 1995 and 2002. This graphically illustrates that US labour productivity
growth over the period 1995–2002 was essentially identical to that observed over the period
1947 to the mid seventies (note that the first trend line almost goes through the year 1978).
The only difference between the two trend lines is that the second trend line has an intercept
that is almost 15% less than that of the first trend line. The lower trend line for the 1995–2002
period suggests that the economy witnessed a downward level shift starting somewhere in the
seventies and ending around 1995. In contrast, the model implies that by the end of the process
countries should experience an upward level shift.
In light of these two difficulties, in the next subsection we propose a modified model of a
technological revolution which (i) does not rely on agents being forward looking to explain the
relatively poor growth performance of high population growth countries during the period 1978–
1995, (ii) allows for a downward level shift in labour productivity by the end of the process.
We chose to present this alternative model at the end of the paper, as opposed to presenting in
Section 1, since it is a model with more controversial assumptions and with implications that
goes against the common wisdom that a technological revolution should necessarily increase
productivity.
3.1 A Modified Interpretation
The model we present here builds on the theoretical and empirical insights we gains from the
model in Section 1.20 In particular, it focuses on how economies adapt to a new technologi-
cal paradigm as represented by a discrete change in the production process. Furthermore, it
again emphasizes the central role of population growth in explaining cross-country differences in
growth performance during the transition. The main difference in the model is that instead of
introducing a new technological paradigm that requires new skills to operate, the current model
introduces a new technology that renders work more routinized, and thereby reduces the need
to motivate workers or favour initiative. In order to capture such a possibility, we exploit ideas
developed in the efficiency wage literature (especially the gift exchange literature).21 To this
end, let us consider an initial situation where a good X can be produced using the following
production function:
X(t) = Kox (t)
α(Lox(t)e(t))
1−α
where 0 6 α 6 1. Kox is physical capital, L
o
x is labour time and e is effort (or initiative). The
main assumption we draw from the efficiency wage literature is that e reacts to the degree to
which the wage paid by a producer of X exceeds the competitive wage. That is, if we let wz(t)
20The interested reader is referred to the technical appendix to this paper for a more formal derivation of the
model.
21Note that our results do not hinge on the adoption of the efficiency wage hypothesis. The results would hold
under alternative modelings of the labour market providing they generate rents.
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represent the competitive wage for labour and we denote by wx(t) the wage paid to a worker
producing X, our main assumption is that effort is an increasing function of wox(t)/wz(t) as
stated below
e(t) = e
(
wox(t)
wz(t)
)
, e′
(
wox
wz(t)
)
> 022
In this case, the optimal choice of wx satisfies the condition:
e′
(
wox(t)
wz(t)
)
e
(
wox(t)
wz(t)
) wox(t)
wz(t)
= 1
Let us denote the optimal relative wage that solves the above decision by γ⋆ and let us denote
e(γ⋆) by e⋆. Thus, e⋆ is the optimal level of initiative (effort) to implement.
Now consider the introduction of an alternative means of producing X given by F (Knx (t), L
n
x(t)),
where Knx (t) is a new type of capital. The main feature of this new technology is that it no
longer depends explicitly on effort. This implies that a firm using this technology will find it
optimal to pay workers the reservation wage wz(t) instead of paying an above market wage. The
technological change that would allow a transformation of this type could be associated with
making tasks more routine and hence less dependent on initiative. However, there may be a
drawback with a more routine method of production in that it may be less productive than the
conventional technology when the latter is operated at the optimal level of effort. To capture
this idea, let F (Knx (t), L
n
x(t)) be given by
F (Knx (t), L
n
x(t)) = K
n
x (t)
α(e˜Lnx(t))
1−α
where e˜ < e⋆ is the level of effort implemented in the routinized new technology without a
need to pay a wage premium.23 The new technology therefore saves on wage costs at the
price of inducing lower productivity. The question then is how does an economy adjust to the
introduction of such a technology? To answer this question, we need to pose the problem in
a general equilibrium framework that permits an endogenous determination of wz(t). To this
end, consider the situation where there is a tradeable final good Y that is produced using to
non-traded intermediate goods X and Z according to the function:
Y (t) = X(t)ϕZ(t)1−ϕ, 0 < ϕ 6 1
and assume that the good Z is produced according to the production function
Z(t) = AzKz(t)
αLz(t)
1−α
22We are assuming that the effort function is such that it is optimal for the firm to pay a wage premium.
23Note that e could be better than e(1), above, because effort might be more effectively monitored in the
routinized production process. This is particularly likely to be true if the new technology involves interactions
with computers which are recording data on output.
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which implies that the production of the good Z is not subject to motivation issues.24 We assume,
as in Section 1, that there is international trade in capital and that there is an irreversibility
constraint on domestic capital accumulation for all there types of capital (Kox ,K
n
x ,Kz). The
accumulation equations for capital are standard with physical depreciation rate given by δ. The
population in the economy grows at rate n and households maximize the discounted utility
obtained by the consumption of the final good. In the absence of the routinized technology for
the production of good X, it is easy to verify that the equilibrium level of output–per–worker,
y(t) = Y (t)/L(t), in the economy is given by:
y(t) = A
1−ϕ
1−α
z
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α (
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ
) 1
1−α
e⋆ϕγ⋆1−ϕ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)γ⋆
which is independent of n. Hence, before the introduction of the routinized organization of work,
demographics exerts no effect on labour productivity.
Now consider introducing into such an economy the routinized method of production for X
where e˜ satisfies the condition γ⋆e˜/e⋆ > 1. Under this condition, it is profitable at initial
prices to switch the production of X from the older technology towards the new routinized
technology. However, the switch is not immediate since the new technology requires another
form of capital which is built up gradually through investment. In the meantime, the capital in
the old technology depreciates slowly. In this case, the time path of output–per–worker in the
economy is given by
y(t) =
(
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕA1−αz
) 1
1−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
e˜ϕ +
γ⋆ − 1
γ⋆
r + δ
α
(
e⋆
γ⋆e˜
) 1−α
α
kox(t
⋆)e−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆)
In Figure 9, we report the evolution of labour productivity and the (log) labour productivity
differential between an economy with a high and a lw population rate of growth after the intro-
duction of the new technology. Inspection of the figure indicates that the model possesses many
of dynamic properties as the model developed in section 1. First, introducing the routinized
technology triggers a drop in labour productivity, as depicted in panel (a) of the figure.25 Sec-
ond, after the introduction of the routinized technology, the higher population growth country
initially experiences a lower rate of growth in labour productivity than the smaller population
growth country. Later, as it catches up to the same steady state, the labour productivity in the
high population growth economy will grow at a faster pace.
The main difference relative to the model of Section 1, is that the new technology, once intro-
duced, induces a long run a negative effect on the level of labour productivity. As we argued
24Note that we assume that the elasticity of output with respect to each factor is the same in each sector and
each technology. This assumption is made to keep analytical tractability. This assumption can be easily relaxed
without altering our results at the price of loosing a simple analytical solution.
25To see this just compute the difference between y(t), t < t⋆, as produced with the non–routinized technology,
and y(t) at the time of introduction of the routinized technology (t = t⋆).
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Figure 9: Labour Productivity in the Transition
t* Time
(a) Labor Productivity
n=0
n>0
t*
(b) Differences in Labor Productivity
Time
earlier, this is more consistent with that observed in the US over the period 1960–2002 (see
Figure 8) than the pattern predicted by the model of Section 1. Hence, the modified model
presented in this section suggests that since the late seventies we may have witnessed the in-
troduction of a new technology that has rendered the labour market more competitive at the
cost of a permanent negative level effect on productivity.26 It is our belief that such a model
provides a better explanation of the main observations.
4 Conclusion
The object of this paper has been to show how cross–country comparisons of medium-run eco-
nomic performance can help refine our understanding of recent economic history. The main
empirical pattern we documented was a drastic change in the co-movement between labour pro-
ductivity growth and population growth over the period 1960–2002. In particular, we showed
that prior to the mid seventies, this co–movement was close to zero. From the late seventies
to the mid nineties, this co–movement was strongly negative. There is also some evidence that
the correlation may have become positive after 1995. To interpret such a pattern, we have
presented two models of major technological change, in the spirit of the General Purpose Tech-
nology literature. In both models, population growth interacts with the adoption speed of a new
technological paradigm to produce the type of U shaped pattern of correlations between labour
productivity growth and population growth observed in the data. Thus, patterns of productivity
and population growth across countries provide support for the view that the world economy
26The model presented here can easily be extended to be consistent with an increase in the returns to skill. For
example, consider a situation where the good X only requires unskilled labour while the good Z can be produced
by both skilled labour and unskilled in the production of good Z where (i) skilled labour is substitutable to
unskilled labour but is more productive and (ii) the productivity differential between skilled and unskilled labour
is greater than the rent paid to unskilled labour in sector X. Under these conditions, the average wage paid to
unskilled workers will drop thereby leading to an increase in the average differential between skilled and unskilled
workers.
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has witnessed a major technological revolution starting around 1978, and that the speed of ad-
justment to that structural change for a particular country has been, to a large extent, driven
by its demographics.
These observations, in and of themselves, are important in policy discussions since they suggest
that relative economic performances across countries since 1995 may in large part reflect a
reversal of patterns observed pre–1995, as opposed to the effects of recent policies. In contrast,
the relatively strong growth performance of several countries, and most notably the US, since
the mid–1990’s has been used by some observers as evidence of the desirability of a US tax
system and social policy. Given that the recent patterns can be explained by a medium term
economic model driven by demographics, we would argue that this policy conclusion should be
treated with caution.27
At a more speculative level, we have suggested that recent economic history may best be ex-
plained by a model of a technological revolution where the new technological paradigm favours
the development of a more competitive labour market at the cost of a negative level shift in
productivity. We argued in favour of this interpretation based both on the pattern of labour
productivity observed in the US over the last 50 years, as well as the view that it takes excessive
forward looking behaviour by agents to explain a process that involves lost in productivity for
twenty years before seeing any gains. However, only more research on the issue will allow us to
provide a more definite answer.
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Appendix
A Data
Three datasets were used in this study. Data on output, population and investment shares are
taken from the PennWorld Table 6.0 downloadable from http://webhost.bridgew.edu/baten/.
Education data are taken from Barro and Lee [2000] dataset, which is downloadable from
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. Finally, data regarding employment,
unemployment and labour force are taken from the OECD Economic outlook 75.
Our measure of income, y, is the logarithm of real GDP chain per worker (RGDPW in PWT 6.0),
where the definition of a worker is based of economically active population.
Population is POP in PWT 6.0. Workers are computed as the population from 15 to 64 obtained
from
POPWt =
real GDP chain per capita
real GDP chain per worker
× population =
RGDPL
RGDPW
× POP
n then denotes the rate of growth of the 15–64 population.
The PWT 6.0 stopped in 1998. We therefore used the rate of growth of investment, output and
population obtained from OECD sources in order to extend the dataset up to 2002.
In the version of the OECD Economic Outlook we used, employment, unemployment and labour
force data started later than 1960: Australia (1964), Austria (1965) and Netherlands (1969).
We therefore the rate of growth of each of these variable (obtained from an earlier version of the
Compendium) to retrapolate the series.
B Solving the model
The interested reader is referred to the technical appendix of this paper for detailed proofs of the
propositions (available from http://fabcol.free.fr). In this section, we only aim at solving
the labour allocation problem and use it to derive output–per–worker.
As stated in the body text, the labour allocation problem, stated in intensive form, is
max
{s(t),h(t)}∞
t=t⋆
∫ ∞
t⋆
e−(r−n)(t−t
⋆) (wo(t)(1− h(t)− s(t)) + wn(t)s(t)) dt
s.t. S˙(t) = Ωh(t) + ns(t)− ns(t)
Letting µ(t) denote the shadow price of skilled labour, we have the following set of optimality
conditions.
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wo(t) =Ωµ(t) (11)
µ˙(t) =− (wn(t)− wo(t)) + rµ(t) (12)
As soon as the economy adopts the new technology, households stop investing in the old capital
which just depreciates over time, such that, using the demand for old capital, we have28
ko(t) = ko(t⋆)e−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆), ∀t > t⋆ (13)
On the contrary, it is always worthwhile to invest in the new technology and the rental price of
capital is given by qn(t) = r + δ. Then, the capital stock is given by
kn(t) = (1 + γ)
(
α
r + δ
) 1
1−α
s(t) (14)
Using this result in the demand for skilled labour, we get
wn(t) = (1− α)θ with θ ≡ (1 + γ)
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(15)
Since both wn(t) actually jumps to its steady state value, the system (11)–(12) can be simply
solved to give
wo(t) =
Ω
r +Ω
wn(t) = (1− α)
Ωθ
r +Ω
(16)
Then using the demand for unskilled labour, we obtain an expression for h(t)
h(t) = 1− s(t)−
(
r +Ω
Ωθ
) 1
α
ko(t⋆)−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆) (17)
Plugging the latter expression in the law of motion of skilled labour, and solving the implied
differential equation, we get
s(t) = 1− e−Ω(t−t
⋆) −
Ω
Ω− δ − n
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1
α
(
r + δ
α
) 1
1−α
ko(t⋆)
(
e−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆) − e−Ω(t−t
⋆)
)
Plugging this result in the definition of the old and the new technologies, we obtain the following
expression for output–per–worker
y(t) =(1 + γ)
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
+
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1
α (1 + γ)(r + δ)
α
(
Ω
r +Ω
−
Ω
Ω− δ − n
)
ko(t⋆)e−(δ+n)(t−t
⋆)
+ (1 + γ)
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(
Ω
Ω− δ − n
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1
α
(
r + δ
α
) 1
1−α
ko(t⋆)− 1
)
e−Ω(t−t
⋆)
which corresponds to the law of motion of output–per–worker reported in the main text.
28See the technical appendix for a formal proof of this statement.
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C Proof of proposition
Proof of Proposition 2: The steady state output in the economy where only the old tech-
nology is available is given by
yo =
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
The immediate effect of introducing the new technology is that output jumps to the new level
y(t⋆) =
(
r +Ω
Ω(1 + γ)
) 1−α
α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
where we set ko(t⋆) to the steady state value of the economy with the old technology. Noting that
this rewrites y(t⋆) =
(
r+Ω
Ω(1+γ)
) 1−α
α
yo, and that by assumption Ωγ/r > 1, we have y(t⋆) < yo.
q.e.d 
Proof of Proposition 3: In order to prove the first part of the proposition, it is convenient
to rewrite the dynamics of output–per–worker as
y(t) = ψ0 +
(
ψ1 −
ψ2
Ω− δ − n
)
e−(n+δ)(t−t
⋆) +
(
ψ2
Ω− δ − n
− ψ0
)
e−Ω(t−t
⋆)
where ψ0 = (1+γ)
(
α
r+δ
) α
1−α
, ψ1 =
(
r+Ω
Ω(1+γ)
) 1
α (1+γ)(r+δ)
α
Ω
r+Ωk
o(t⋆) and ψ2 =
(
r+Ω
Ω(1+γ)
) 1
α (1+γ)(r+δ)
α
Ωko(t⋆).
What we need to show is that the larger the rate of population growth the lower the growth
in output–per–worker at the beginning of the transition, which amounts to prove that the first
order derivative of the rate of growth of output–per–worker with respect to n is negative when
t is close to t⋆.
The rate of growth of output–per–worker writes as
y˙(t)
y(t)
= −
(δ + n)
(
ψ1 −
ψ2
Ω−δ−n
)
e−(n+δ)(t−t
⋆) +Ω
(
ψ2
Ω−δ−n − ψ0
)
e−Ω(t−t
⋆)
ψ0 +
(
ψ1 −
ψ2
Ω−δ−n
)
e−(n+δ)t +
(
ψ2
Ω−δ−n − ψ0
)
e−Ω(t−t⋆)
= −
u(t, n)
v(t, n)
We therefore have that
∂y˙(t)/y(t)
∂n
= −
∂u(t,n)
∂n
v(t, n)− ∂n(t,n)
∂n
u(t, n)
v(t, n)2
Straightforward calculation shows that at the time of introduction of the new technology, t = t⋆,
we have u(t, n) = (δ + n)ψ1 − Ωψ0 + ψ2, v(t, n) = ψ1,
∂u(t, n)
∂n
= ψ1 and
∂v(t, n)
∂n
= 0. Hence,
plugging these results into the derivative of the rate of growth of output–per–worker evaluated
at time t⋆, we get
∂y˙(t)/y(t)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
t=t⋆
= −1
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which proves the first part of the proposition.
The second part of the proposition is trivial as the steady state of the economy does not depend
on the rate of population growth. So no matter n, all economies will tend to the same limit.
Since the rate of growth in the high population growth economy is lower at the beginning of
the transition than in the low population growth economy, it has to be greater at some point to
converge to the same steady state.
q.e.d 
